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ABSTRACT 
Adolf A. Berle was perhaps the preeminent scholar of the modern 
corporation. He was also an occasional scholar of the modern legal 
profession. This Article surveys his writings on the legal profession from 
the 1930s to the 1960s, from the sharp criticisms he leveled at lawyers, 
particularly corporate lawyers, during the Great Depression, to his sunnier 
account of the lawyer’s role in the postwar era. I argue that Berle’s views 
were shaped both by the reformist tradition he inherited from Louis 
Brandeis and his writings on the corporation, which left him convinced 
that the fate of the legal profession would be determined by that of the 
modern corporation. 
INTRODUCTION 
What did the growth of the modern corporation mean for the legal 
profession? In 1932, Adolf Berle, perhaps the preeminent student of the 
modern corporation, tried to answer this question. He already was a busy 
man. Immersed in a thriving corporate law practice, he was also teaching 
law at Columbia University, was preparing for the publication of a 
landmark work on the modern corporation, and within a month would 
become a top advisor to the next President of the United States.1 Early that 
year, though, he took on one more task: drafting an entry for a new 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences on the “Modern Legal Profession.”2 
                                                     
* I. Herman Stern Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. My thanks to Charles 
O’Kelley, participants in the Berle X conference, Robert Gordon, and Allan Megill, who first brought 
the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences to my attention long ago. The title quotation is from Adolf A. 
Berle Jr., Book Review, 76 HARV. L. REV. 430, 430 (1962) (reviewing BERYL HAROLD LEVY, 
CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? (1961)). 
 1. See JORDAN SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA 
71–72 (1987). 
 2. Adolf A. Berle, The Modern Legal Profession, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
340 (Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 1933) [hereinafter Berle, Modern Legal Profession]; see also Letter 
642 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:641 
His eventual contribution was short—only six two-column pages—and 
was then and since eclipsed by his great work: The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property.3 But this short essay is worth a closer look. For one, 
it was one of the first academic studies of the modern legal profession and, 
in particular, the modern “law factory” in which corporate law work was 
done.4 Beyond this, though, it presents an account of how the legal 
profession was changed by the modern corporation and asks what role is 
left for the lawyer in the modern corporate world. 
I. THE 1920S AND THE CRITIQUE OF CORPORATE LAW 
While Berle is now remembered as a scholar and public figure, for 
much of his life he was a corporate lawyer, and a practicing one. He was 
keen to make this clear. Early on he briefly toyed with a purely academic 
life; after a brilliant career at Harvard College, which included earning a 
master’s degree in history, he thought about becoming a history professor 
but chose instead to enter the Harvard Law School, lured by the public 
stage offered by a legal career and inspired by the example of family hero 
Louis D. Brandeis.5 After graduation, he joined Brandeis’s firm, Brandeis, 
Nutter & Dunbar (Berle’s father had made a call on his behalf) where he 
worked on a variety of matters including “a good many smaller matters of 
corporate law.”6 He left within a year when World War I intervened and 
was soon sent by the government to the U.S.-occupied Dominican 
Republic where he was charged with untangling “a web of landholding 
laws that inhibited” production of sugar needed for the war effort.7 After 
the war’s conclusion and a detour to serve in the U.S. delegation at the 
Paris Peace Talks, Berle returned to the United States and joined the New 
York law firm of Rounds, Hatch, Dillingham, and Debevoise.8 At the time, 
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it was a fairly large New York firm with nine partners.9 He soon developed 
a specialization as a “lawyer for sugar producers” in the Dominican 
Republic, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.10 He struck out on his own at the end of 
1923 to form Lippitt & Berle with Guy Lippitt, another expert in the 
Dominican Republic, and in 1933 dissolved that firm to form Berle & 
Berle with his brother Rudolf where he continued to practice except during 
periods of public service.11 
Berle’s practice did not take all his time or supply all his income. In 
1927 he married the wealthy Beatrice Bishop, and the couple agreed that 
her wealth would in part fund his public activities. But he was still a 
working lawyer representing corporate clients, and a fairly successful 
one.12 He did not see practice as detracting from his teaching, legal reform 
efforts, and scholarship. To the contrary, Berle believed that an active 
corporate practice was essential to these other activities. As he wrote to 
one correspondent in 1928, “I hardly see how [corporate finance] can be 
effectively taught except by someone who leads a double life—one in a 
law school, another, in rather close connection with the financial 
machinery . . . . At least half my teaching materials are the loot of my own 
desk or of current financial transactions.”13 He also had a hand in legal 
reform efforts, advising drafters who were re-writing corporation laws in 
several states, including Ohio, California, and Delaware (the last discussed 
below).14 
He made his name in the 1920s with a series of law review articles 
criticizing recent developments in corporation law and finance.15 While 
his exact targets varied from article to article, overall he attacked statutory 
developments providing an array of new corporate tools, notably “blank 
check stock,” which Berle believed would allow corporate management to 
divert corporate profits and property from shareholders to themselves. In 
response, he developed a legal theory, most fully stated in 1931’s 
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, that managers’ powers should be 
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treated as “powers in trust” “subject to equitable limitation when the power 
has been exercised to the detriment of [shareholders’] interest, however 
absolute the grant of power may have been in terms, and however correct 
the technical exercise of it may have been.”16 
There is something odd about these articles in light of Berle’s own 
career. He claimed special insight into these developments because he was 
a working corporate lawyer, and most of the innovations he criticized were 
of course devised by other lawyers. Yet, with one notable exception, his 
articles in the 1920s rarely feature lawyers as actors. In his articles, these 
legal developments appear the product of impersonal, offstage forces; 
there is little discussion of the methods by which corporate statutes were 
changed or of individuals making the changes. In the rare places where 
actors are specified, they are more likely to be “bankers and promoters” 
than lawyers.17 Berle does identify actors who will, he predicts, rein in the 
new developments, but these actors are courts, specifically the courts of 
equity he looks to protect shareholders’ interests. The omission of any 
significant discussion of lawyers may of course have been the result of 
scholarly convention and articles focusing on doctrine instead of 
personalities, but it is still striking. 
There is one exception. In a 1929 Columbia Law Review article, 
Berle targeted recent amendments to Delaware’s General Corporation 
Law (DGCL), and he identifies the changes as the product of practicing 
lawyers.18 As he reported in facially neutral terms (“No criticism is here 
directed to this fact”), the changes to the DGCL had been drafted by a self-
selected 
committee of New York lawyers representative of a number of the 
great firms whose principal business was concerned with investment 
banking. . . . The group represented primarily one set of interests—
that of the investment bankers—and, to the extent these interests act 
in conjunction with corporate management’s, the latter also.19 
The result, Berle contended, was to help management and harm 
shareholders. Yet even here, those lawyers’ responsibility is unclear. They 
did execute the pro-management changes—“it is obviously the design of 
the draftsmen to make these powers . . . untrammeled faculties of the 
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management of corporations”—but behind these legal changes were the 
lawyers’ clients, the investment banking houses that seem to have 
demanded the changes.20 One reason Berle may have identified the 
lawyers here was undisclosed in the article: he had been a member of the 
committee redrafting the Delaware statute, but his proposals had lost out.21 
In private he expressed more ire at the lawyers who redrafted the act. In a 
letter to Walter Lippmann, Berle identified the major New York firms, 
including the Cravath firm Sullivan & Cromwell, and Davis Polk as 
drafters of the law and urged Lippmann to bring the changes to light and 
“give it a raking over in the World.”22 But in his published writings, Berle 
avoided such criticism. 
II. THE 1930S AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE CORPORATE LAWYER 
A. The ‘Modern Legal Profession’ and the Attack on  
the Corporate Bar in the 1930s 
Apart from a few isolated passages, there is little evidence that Berle 
gave the legal profession sustained scrutiny before the 1930s, and he 
certainly did not take it as his subject as he would the corporation, which 
raises the question of why he wrote on the subject for the Encyclopedia of 
the Social Sciences at all. The answer lies in both the Encyclopedia itself 
and in the legal tradition in which Berle placed himself. 
The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences was intended not as a 
student aide or handbook but as one of the great scholarly achievements 
of the age.23 Its creator, the Columbia University economist E. R. A. 
Seligman, envisioned it as a “‘synopsis of the progress’ of the social 
science fields” and “a center of authoritative knowledge for the creation 
of a sounder and more informed public opinion.”24 In the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, when it was being assembled, it was understood to be the 
most “important American scholarly publication since World War I,”25 
and upon publication its volumes went to “nearly every school, college, 
and public library in the country.”26 The multi-year project was generously 
funded by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller and Russell Sage Foundations, 
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with nearly every prominent social scientist and public intellectual in the 
United States and Europe contributing essays (the German contributors, 
many who were forced to flee Germany after 1933, would become a 
nucleus of the famed “University in Exile”).27 Among the host of notables 
contributing essays to the Encyclopedia were Ruth Benedict, Franz Boas, 
W. E. B. du Bois, John Dewey, and Roscoe Pound. 
Berle may have come to the Encyclopedia through his friendship 
with Alvin Johnson, director of the New School for Social Research and 
Associate Editor of the Encyclopedia,28 or through a Columbia connection 
with Seligman. Whatever the exact link, Berle was first approached to 
contribute in 1929 when he wrote a short entry on the American Legion,29 
and then with Gardiner Means, a long one on the Corporation.30 He was 
not asked to contribute his entry on the Modern Legal Profession until 
1932, however, as part of a larger entry on the Legal Profession, which 
also included sections on the Ancient and Medieval profession by H. D. 
Hazeltine of Cambridge University and Modern Legal Education by Max 
Radin of the University of California at Berkeley.31 
That his entry was not commissioned until 1932 mattered 
enormously, for it meant that Berle would be examining the legal 
profession, and particularly the corporate bar, at a moment the profession 
was experiencing profound self-doubt. As Jerold Auerbach put it, the 
Depression “compelled the lawyer whose public identity and professional 
esteem rested upon service to a restricted corporate clientele to confront 
the implications of his choices.”32 Not only the present state of the legal 
profession, but its evolution over the past half-century would come under 
scrutiny during the 1930s in a spate of analyses of which Berle’s was the 
first. 
The historical story was straightforward and confirmed by later 
scholars. Beginning in the 1870s a legal elite once composed of trial 
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lawyers and public figures who served a range of individuals had become 
one dominated by lawyers who largely served corporate clients.33 
By the mid-1880s the locus of the most elite practice had decisively 
shifted from the courtroom to the law office and conference room. 
The main work of this practice was to serve as legal brokers and 
intermediaries between large American corporations trying to attract 
new capital . . . and the investment banking communities of Wall 
Street and Europe.34 
These new corporate lawyers practiced in new ways, largely 
abandoning the one- or two-man offices prevalent earlier in the nineteenth 
century and instead forming larger law firms, which awed contemporaries 
dubbed “law factories.”35 In 1872, New York had ten firms with four or 
more lawyers; by 1914, it had eighty-five.36 
Well before Berle, the transformation of legal practice attracted 
critics.37 As early as 1895 one anonymous author complained that “[the 
bar] has allowed itself to lose, in large measure, the lofty independence, 
the genuine learning, the fine sense of professional dignity and 
honor . . . . [I]t has become increasingly contaminated with the spirit of 
commerce.”38 In a survey examining New York lawyers, Robert Gordon 
found “[b]ar association speakers and writers on ethics deliver[ing] 
hundreds of jeremiads between 1890 and 1920 lamenting the increasing 
commercialization of the bar and its growing dependence on corporate 
clienteles.”39 Others, however, rejected the simple story of inevitable 
decline and sought instead to carve out a new place for the lawyer who 
wished to retain his autonomy and social influence in this corporate world. 
The one who would have the greatest influence would be Berle’s idol 
Louis D. Brandeis. 
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In 1905, Brandeis was asked to speak on “the ethics of the legal 
profession” to a student group at Harvard,40 and delivered his famous 
speech “The Opportunity in the Law.”41 Here Brandeis put forward a 
“Progressive-Professional Ideal” for lawyers that would deeply influence 
Berle.42 Brandeis began by acknowledging that the “lawyer has become 
largely a part of the business world . . . [and] by far the greater part of the 
work done by lawyers is done not in court at all, but in advising men in 
important matters, and mainly in business affairs.”43 This development did 
not, however, necessarily restrict the lawyer’s role. “[A]lthough the lawyer 
is not playing in affairs of State the part he did, his influence is, or at all 
events may be, quite as important as it ever was in the United States; and 
it is simply a question of how that influence is to be exerted.”44 The present 
problem for lawyers, Brandeis argued, was that too many had missed, or 
rejected, the new role and the opportunities it offered—or at least had 
chosen the wrong side. “The leaders of the bar . . . have, with rare 
exceptions, been ranged on the side of the corporations, and the people 
have been represented in the main by men of very meager legal ability.”45 
Unless lawyers changed their operations, he concluded, 
[t]he immense corporate wealth will necessarily develop a hostility 
from which much trouble will come to us unless the excesses of 
capital are curbed, through the respect for law . . . . There will come 
a revolt of the people against the capitalists unless the aspirations of 
the people are given some adequate legal expression; and to this end 
cooperation of the leaders of the bar is essential.46 
Here was the opportunity in the law, to serve not only corporations 
but the people who aimed to tame the new corporate order.  
Brandeis provided a model for the public-spirited lawyer in the 
corporate age—a model it appears Berle admired—but his ideas cannot be 
said to have won the field.47 His speech deeply affected some of the 
individuals who heard it—Brandeis’s biographer reported that it made a 
“lasting impression on young Felix Frankfurter”—but it certainly did not 
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transform the corporate bar.48 Lawyers continued to express some unease 
about law becoming a business,49 but in the two decades after Brandeis’s 
speech they seem to have gotten more comfortable with it. If anything, 
corporate lawyers’ stock rose; one historian has concluded that “[i]n the 
twenties corporate lawyers enjoyed unchallenged professional hegemony 
and unsurpassed opportunity to articulate their wishes as professional 
values.”50 That would change with the stock market crash and the Great 
Depression. The 1930s would see a series of blistering criticisms of the 
legal profession and the corporate lawyer. One of the first and most 
influential would be Berle’s. 
It is doubtful that the editors of the Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences realized what they would be getting from Berle. Most of its 
entries were written by famous scholars, but followed an outline provided 
by the Encyclopedia’s staff,51 and when he started his entry Berle was 
provided such an outline.52 He largely ignored it. Berle’s entry certainly 
did provide an overview of the legal profession, but it was not simply a 
survey of the field. His was an analysis instead distilled from the 
Progressive tradition inherited from Brandeis, his own work as a corporate 
lawyer, and not the least his experience writing The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property. Where Brandeis had looked hopefully to the future, 
though—his essay was after all called “The Opportunity in the Law”—
Berle painted a bleaker picture. The “Modern Legal Profession” his essay 
described was almost unredeemable, its leaders reduced to mere adjuncts 
to corporations. 
Berle was supposed to survey the entire legal profession, but in the 
entry he focused on corporate law and the “law factories.”53 He recognized 
of course that most lawyers in 1932 did not work at large corporate firms—
he wrote of “the vast majority of lawyers, practicing alone or in partnership 
with another . . . [who] run the entire gamut from the lawyer who seeks 
chiefly to be a human being to the marching lawyer, who finds it necessary 
to make his living by dubious means.”54 But that was not where his interest 
lay. So, he began by reviewing the events that produced the new legal 
order, describing changes that meshed with his account of corporate 
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evolution in The Modern Corporation and Private Property. He attributed 
changes in the legal profession to the economic and business 
developments accompanying the rise of the modern corporation. 
According to Berle, “the dominance of the commercial and industrial 
structures, the complexity of business organizations and the position of 
world economic leadership steadily thrust upon the legal profession 
problem after problem which was not originally intended to form a part of 
legal practise.”55 These changes turned the legal profession into “virtually 
an intellectual jobber and contractor in business matters.”56 They also 
produced the modern law firm, which further worked against the 
independence of lawyers. As Berle put it, 
the ‘legal factory’—the great corporation offices of New York and 
Chicago, having thirty or forty partners and perhaps two hundred or 
more associated attorneys, . . . [whose] tremendous overhead 
requires the assurance of a steady flow of a large volume of business; 
these institutions are . . . largely adjuncts to the great commercial and 
investment banks.57 
(Berle, it should be noted, exaggerated the size of the new firms.58) 
Yet, Berle had to admit, these firms had at least one significant 
accomplishment: “[T]he creation of a legal framework for the new 
economic system, build largely around the modern corporation, the 
division of ownership of industrial property from control and the 
increasing concentration of economic power in the industrial east in the 
hands of a few individuals.”59 While these developments gave lawyers a 
new role, they also took one away. Seemingly inexorably, the rise of the 
corporations led to “the transfer some time toward the end of the 
nineteenth century of the responsible leadership in social development 
from the lawyer to the business man.”60 
This was not a morally neutral process. In The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, Berle and Gardiner Means’s great work, economic 
developments simply occur, impersonally and inexorably, as property 
accrues to the corporation while ownership disperses. In the Modern Legal 
Profession, in contrast, corporate growth produced the corruption of the 
legal profession—and “corruption” does appear the right word. Here, 
Berle wrote of “[t]he manipulation of the railroad builders, the oil 
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pioneers, the utilities and traction magnates, and the accompanying 
political corruption,” and claimed that in “defending, legalizing and 
maintaining this exploitative development the legal profession found its 
principal function.”61 Here, the growth of giant corporations is presented 
as “exploitative,” by implication tainting those who assisted in it. 
Thirty years before, Brandeis had argued that the rise of the modern 
corporation offered lawyers a new and positive role in society—if they 
would take it. Berle held out less hope, seemingly believing that the 
modern corporation, and the corruption it appeared to engender, only 
closed off opportunities. The new developments had, he admitted, 
produced a few men like Brandeis, who “after attaining primacy in that 
branch of the profession revolted from the cynicism of its views.”62 For 
the most part, however, the corporate lawyer who wished no longer to 
merely serve corporate interests had to take a new path, “either to turn to 
his books and become a scholar or to turn to public life and go on the bench 
or into political office.”63 And public life posed its own problems. “The 
common result was that after a relatively brief period of public office the 
lawyer returned to his profession with enhanced reputation and became a 
more effective servant of the evolving industrial scheme.”64 Nor would the 
organized bar be a counterweight to these developments. In the larger 
cities, the bar’s cohesion had “broken down.”65 In smaller cities it kept 
some cohesion but had “changed in character; from an organization 
concerned primarily with maintaining the dignity and serviceableness of a 
profession it has become a substantial agreement among attorneys to 
protect each other.”66 The bar’s capacity for self-government had 
disappeared, leaving “no organized opinion of the bar to exercise an 
effective control.”67 While once lawyers were seen as officers of the court 
and “an integral part of the scheme of justice,” they were today “the paid 
servant of his client, justified in using any technical lever that the law 
supplies in order to forward the latter’s interest.”68 “The complete 
commercialization of the American bar had stripped it of any social 
functions it might have performed for individuals without wealth.”69 
While there were a few developments, such as the spread of legal aid 
offices and an increase in voluntary legal work, which pointed to “a 
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possible socialization of the profession,”70 (by which he apparently meant 
the profession taking on new social responsibilities) he found strong forces 
working against this. “In the economic sphere . . . socialization of the legal 
profession is almost a contradiction in terms.”71 
In conclusion, Berle saw two possible paths for the American legal 
profession:  
One is that the profession merely does what the institutional set up 
appears to demand. The other is that it can assist in transforming the 
underlying potentialities in ethical and economic attitudes into actual 
results in the form of social and legal organization. In the United 
States the profession has tended strongly to the former function.72 
Despite his belief that “the direction of the new economic trends indicates 
the need for stronger intellectual guidance from the profession,” he voiced 
little hope this would actually occur.73 
Berle’s was only the first of a series of attacks on the legal profession 
leveled during that decade.74 The cause was, obviously, the Great 
Depression, and a suspicion that lawyers had helped usher it in. In his 1933 
presidential address to the American Association of Law Schools, Yale 
Dean Charles Clark “reminded his colleagues that financiers and 
businessmen might bear the brunt of blame for the Depression, but ‘at their 
right hands as counselors and advisers stand the ablest of the men we have 
instructed and we ourselves are not too far away.’”75 Later that year Karl 
Llewellyn, drawing on a draft version of the Encyclopedia entry, published 
an essay called The Bar Specializes—With What Results? in which he 
echoed much of Berle’s criticism of the modern bar.76 “The most 
significant fact about the modern metropolitan bar,” Llewellyn wrote, was 
that “most of its best brains, most of its inevitable leaders, have moved 
masswise . . . into highly paid specialization in the service of large 
corporations. They are the ablest of legal technicians . . . . But their main 
work is in essence the doing of business.”77 While Llewellyn 
acknowledged that this may have been required by the needs of the time, 
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like Berle and Brandeis he concluded that it had produced a bar that served 
business to the neglect of others. 
[T]he fitting of law to new conditions has been concentrated on only 
one phase of new conditions: to wit, the furtherance of the business 
and financing side, from the angle of the enterpriser and the financier. 
It has been focused on organizing their control of others, and on 
blocking off control of them by others.78 
The most eminent critic spoke a year later, when Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone delivered the dedication of the new University of Michigan Law 
School building. While there is no indication that he was drawing on Berle 
or Llewellyn, the Justice’s comments showed how widespread the belief 
was that corporate practice had corrupted the bar. He opened with the 
familiar refrain that “the Bar has not maintained its traditional position of 
public influence and leadership”79 and laid blame for this on the corporate 
bar. “[T]he best skill and capacity of the profession has been drawn into 
the exacting and highly specialized service of business and finance,” he 
claimed.80 “At its worst it has made the learned profession of an earlier 
day the obsequious servant of business, and tainted it with the morals and 
manners of the market place in its most anti-social manifestations.”81 The 
failures of business so apparent by the 1930s—the corporate scandals 
stemming from the “failure to observe the fiduciary principle,”82 “would 
have been impossible but for the complaisance of a Bar, too absorbed in 
the workaday care of private interests . . . to sound the warning that the 
profession looks askance upon these, as things that ‘are not done.’”83 Stone 
closed on a more upbeat note than Berle, asserting that the Bar, if 
inculcated by law schools with a new sense of social responsibility, still 
had the capacity to “exert a power more beneficent and far reaching than 
it or any other non-governmental group has wielded in the past,” but the 
speech as a whole was not encouraging.84 This drumbeat of criticism 
continued through the 1930s, culminating, at least rhetorically, in Fred 
Rodell’s 1939 jeremiad Woe Unto You, Lawyers!, whose title says it all. 85 
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B. The Legal Profession and the Berle–Dodd Debate 
Berle’s essay for the Encyclopedia tells us a good deal about the legal 
profession in the 1930s, but does it tell us anything about Berle, at least 
the Berle who still matters, the prophet of the modern corporate order? I 
think it does, and in particular that it can illuminate a significant aspect of 
his famous debate with Harvard’s E. Merrick Dodd over the purpose of 
the corporation.86 
The debate, carried out in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, 
remains well known after over eighty years.87 Berle, in his 1931 article 
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, argued that the near-unlimited 
power he believed managers wielded over shareholders should be treated 
in the law as power held in trust, “exercisable only for the ratable benefit 
of all the shareholders,” and “subject to equitable limitation when the 
power has been exercised to the detriment of” shareholders.88 Dodd, 
however, picked up on the point that managers had gained new powers 
over the corporation, and new distance from shareholders, to argue that 
this could be a good thing.89 Freed of narrow duties to shareholders, he 
argued that managers should now be treated by the law as “trustees for an 
institution rather than attorneys for the stockholders.”90 Influenced by 
welfare capitalist programs of the 1920s, Dodd believed that if managers 
were given the power to direct corporate wealth to different constituencies, 
rather than solely to shareholders, they would use it wisely.91 “Power over 
the lives of others,” he wrote, “tends to create on the part of those most 
worthy to exercise it a sense of responsibility.”92 The managerial 
autonomy that Berle saw as a threat Dodd welcomed as an opportunity. 
Berle’s reply appeared in For Whom Corporate Managers Are 
Trustees: A Note, and for present purposes, what is most striking is the 
degree to which his reply draws on his experience not as a corporate 
theorist, but as a corporate lawyer and as a critic of the legal profession.93 
Indeed, on re-reading this short article it is surprising how much it talks 
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about lawyers. The retort to Dodd begins by agreeing that the changing 
nature of the corporation (which he and Means were about to dissect in 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property) had produced a new class, 
“the great industrial managers, their bankers and still more the men 
composing their silent ‘control,’ [who] function today more as princes and 
ministers than as promoters or merchants.”94 Dodd thought this new class 
could be trusted to administer the corporation for the benefit of many 
constituencies. Berle, taking on the role of wised-up practitioner who had 
actually dealt with such men, disagreed. Dodd, he claimed, wrote in 
ignorance of what the men who ran corporations were actually like. 
Dodd’s ideas were “theory, not practice. The industrial ‘control’ does not 
now think of himself as a prince; he does not now assume responsibilities 
to the community; his bankers do not now undertake to recognize social 
claims; his lawyers do not advise him in terms of social responsibility.”95 
To be sure, Berle continued, there were a group of lawyers who would 
embrace Dodd’s assertion that management be freed from duties to 
shareholders, but they would not do so out of concern for other corporate 
constituencies. “Challenge to the security holder’s claim” to corporate 
profits, he wrote, “has been made, less articulately but with infinitely more 
effect, by the handful of corporation lawyers, mainly in New York, who 
really determine legal control of the corporate mechanism.”96 These, of 
course, are the same corporate lawyers whom Berle disparaged in the 
Encyclopedia: 
They in fact, and sometimes in words, discard the theory that 
corporate managements are trustees for corporate security holders. 
But they know what the social theorist does not. When the fiduciary 
obligation of the corporate management and ‘control’ to stockholders 
is weakened or eliminated, the management and the ‘control’ become 
for all practical purposes absolute. The claims upon the assembled 
industrial wealth and funneled industrial income which managements 
are then likely to enforce . . . are their own.97 
The message is clear: the practicing lawyer Berle was telling the 
social theorist Dodd how the world really worked. 
The final section of Berle’s reply opened with the question: “What 
ought to be the part of lawyers and the law in this interplay of great hope 
and disillusioning fact?” His answer was that both their history and their 
training indicated lawyers were unfit to undertake wide-ranging reform.98 
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Thus far, he wrote, “lawyers have not given too good an account of 
themselves . . . either in theory or administration.”99 The New York 
lawyers who revised Delaware’s corporate law had “cut to pieces” 
securities holders’ private property rights. “A similar group evolved a 
reorganization procedure under which equity and economics may be dealt 
with almost at will by individuals who are not constrained to recognize 
either.” “A lawyer and an ex-lawyer constructed the outstanding American 
‘investment trust’ bubble.”100 While lawyers did have a function in the 
evolution of the law, it was a cautious and limited one. Their task was 
“widely divergent from that of the economist or social theorist. They must 
meet a series of practical situations from day to day.”101 A careful lawyer 
would not abandon one position, “the idea of corporate trusteeship for 
security holdings,” in the hopes another, more desirable one might 
eventually emerge.102 Until the law of corporate management had more 
fully evolved, “as lawyers, we had best be protecting the interests we 
know, being no less swift to provide for the new interests as they 
successively appear.”103 It is a puzzling discussion—the reader is left 
unsure whether Berle was warning off all social theorizing, or just 
lawyers’ attempts at it—but it did show Berle’s low opinion of the legal 
profession creeping into his work on corporate law. 
III. THE 1950S AND THE CORPORATE LAWYER AS  
A STATESMAN-ADVISOR 
Then Berle moved on to other things. The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, published in 1933, contains almost no reference to the 
legal profession, which should probably not be surprising.104 It is at its core 
an account of impersonal economic forces that work to centralize wealth 
in giant corporations and disperse ownership of those firms. Lawyers may 
have helped this process along, but they did not cause it. Even as that was 
published, he then moved into a series of public roles, culminating in his 
service as Assistant Secretary of State and then Ambassador to Brazil, 
which diverted his energies in other directions until after the end of World 
War II.105 
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Berle did discuss the legal profession at a graduation speech given at 
Cornell Law School in 1938, where he gave some hint that he was still 
thinking about the lawyer’s role. Perhaps due to his audience, much of the 
speech was a bland call to social responsibility in the Brandeisan vein. 
“The legal profession,” Berle told the graduates, 
must change with the times. No longer can any lawyer believe he 
exists to serve his client. He cannot represent a special interest to the 
exclusion of other considerations . . . . If his client cannot see the 
interest involved, . . . his lawyer must see the larger issues for him.106 
But he also spoke there of legal evolution, of his belief that there was 
arising an “unwritten constitutional law, which shall implement and fill 
out the frame of government embodied in our written constitution.”107 This 
was, truth be told, an ill-defined concept; listeners would have left the 
speech not quite knowing how this unwritten law was to operate, except 
that it was somehow to involve government involvement in the new 
economy. Yet Berle was clear about one thing: this new body of law was 
“peculiarly in the custody of the legal profession.”108 
In the late 1940s Berle left government service and resumed his 
corporate law practice at Berle & Berle, as well as teaching at Columbia 
and the innumerable public roles which consumed his later years.109 He 
also was a major public intellectual of the postwar era, summing up his 
views of the modern American corporate economy in The Twentieth 
Century Capitalist Revolution (1954).110 Berle stayed true to his views 
concerning corporate consolidation and the separation of ownership and 
control, arguing that the growth of a few giant corporations in each field 
had produced a new kind of economy, dominated by oligopolies engaged 
in a form of private economic planning far removed from the laissez-faire 
capitalism of the past.111 What had changed was his views on the 
corporation’s role in society. He had come to see it as a “social institution” 
ready to assume the broad responsibilities it had once shunned, a change 
that also changed his view of corporate management. In the Berle–Dodd 
debate he had insisted that present-day corporate managers were not to be 
trusted, and should not be confused with Renaissance princes;112 in the 
Modern Corporation he and Means had speculated that management 
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might in the future “develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing 
a variety of claims by various groups”113—but in the Twentieth Century 
Capitalist Revolution it seemed this future had arrived. In a surprising 
about-face, Berle conceded that Dodd had the better view in their debate, 
and that management’s powers should be used not merely for 
shareholders, but “held in trust for the entire community.”114 
Berle’s new view of the corporation—as assuming social 
responsibility, as unavoidably involved in making decisions that would 
affect its communities, as locked in complex accommodations with 
government and labor115—led to a new view of the possibilities open to 
the corporation’s lawyers. In 1956 he spoke to the New York Bar 
Association on the “Changing Role of the Corporation and Its Counsel.”116 
Over the past half-century, Berle informed his audience, the corporation 
had shifted from a “method of conducting private business to a quasi-
public institution on which the country had come to rely for certain 
services,” a development which meant the in-house lawyer had to “change 
his function and position” as well.117 Once the in-house lawyer had been 
“regarded almost with contempt—he was the ‘tame’ lawyer whose 
standing was lower than the supposedly free, independent practitioner.”118 
As the corporation became a quasi-public institution, though, one that was 
“institutionally a part of the political life of the country,” it became the 
counsel’s task to help navigate the new political waters and recognize the 
political developments that would impinge on the corporation and limit its 
activities.119 The in-house counsel could play a public role by predicting 
the trend of legal doctrine as well as its present-day status. “It is the task 
of the in-house counsel of organizations . . . to judge precisely the legal 
implications of these emerging situations . . . to be sensitive to them, to 
forecast their possibility, and to deal with them before they come up.”120 
Twenty years before, Berle had blamed the rise of the modern corporation 
for diminishing the lawyer’s role and corrupting the legal profession; now 
he argued that it instead made it possible for lawyers to assume a new and 
more significant public role. In a strange inversion of Brandeis’s The 
Opportunity in the Law, it was now the lawyer employed by the 
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corporation, rather than the one opposed to it, who would handle “the 
relations between the corporation and its industry and the community 
represented by some branch of government.”121 
Berle had become comfortable with the corporation—and the 
corporation lawyer. His 1950s work reflected a larger societal consensus 
that the large corporation had been successfully tamed and was the key to 
widespread economic prosperity and even social comity.122 And as the 
corporation’s public image improved, so did the corporation lawyer’s. 
Mark Galanter and Thomas Palay have noted that “the period of the late 
fifties and the early sixties was the one in which the portrayal of lawyers 
in the popular media was unprecedentedly favorable.”123 Lawyers 
themselves were eager to embrace this new image and new role. Robert 
Swaine, in his 1949 history of the Cravath firm, anticipated this 
development when he wrote that the corporate lawyer had gradually taken 
on new roles, so that “[t]oday the American lawyer deals with the 
problems of his business clients on a much broader basis, considers 
substance as more important than form and attempts to relate legal 
problems to their political, economic and social implications.”124 Robert 
Gordon has pointed to broader intellectual developments that also 
contributed to this change, writing that in the postwar period 
a group of lawyers and legal academics—including Lon Fuller, 
Willard Hurst, Harvard ‘Legal Process’ scholars Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks, and corporate lawyer Beryl Harold Levy—theorized, 
from hints dropped by such Progressive lawyers as Brandeis and 
Adolf Berle, the role of the new corporate legal counsel as a 
‘statesman-adviser’.125 
Berle confirmed and expanded on his views a few years later in his 
1962 review of Beryl Levy’s Corporation Lawyer: Saint of Sinner?, a 
work intended to explain the corporate lawyer to a popular audience.126 
Levy was a corporate lawyer and friend of Berle’s,127 and parts of the book 
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embody Berle’s ideas. His historical account of the corporate bar’s 
development fit well with Berle’s. “Shortly after Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
inauguration,” Levy wrote, “the bar was inclined to be rather severe with 
itself when it paused to take inventory of the disasters of the 
depression.”128 Today, though, he found lawyers “in far better repute.”129 
What changed? After a brief summary of the growth of the “law factories,” 
Levy’s account culminated in the postwar America sketched out by Berle, 
where large corporations “cannot be said any longer to be run in a narrow 
and exclusive sense for the corporation’s own family of employees and 
customers or even its stockholders.”130 This gave corporate lawyers a new 
role. If the head of a giant corporation had become “a sort of statesman-
of-business . . . by the same token his legal counselor is a sort of 
statesman-advisor.”131 
In Berle’s review he largely adopted Levy’s conclusions while still 
getting in some jabs at the legal profession. He reiterated his view that 
from the 1890s to the 1930s corporate lawyers “often were[] little more 
than highly paid, powerful mercenary agents of great technical 
competency.”132 They succeeded merely by serving the moguls, and Berle 
pointed to Swaine’s history of the Cravath firm—“[a]n unconsciously 
cynical book”—as proof of this.133 Yet since that era corporate lawyers, at 
least those at the “upper range” had taken on a new role, now operating 
“in that no-man’s land where law, economics, and political science meet, 
and where new law is daily crystallizing.”134 He reiterated that the 
corporation’s postwar position as a “vital part of the public structure of the 
economic republic” created new opportunities for lawyers.135 Corporations 
were now being held to new standards, to a developing “inchoate law 
affecting corporations holding market power, or on which the community 
has come to depend for some economic function.”136 While this new law, 
which appeared as an amalgam of public policy and public opinion, was 
not always on the books, “[t]he moment these principles are seriously 
infringed, the state predictably intervenes.”137 (Berle’s example of the 
working of this “inchoate law” was the steel crisis of 1962, when 
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steelmakers attempted to raise prices and were forced to retreat after a 
public outcry and political pressure.138) It was the job of the “top range 
corporate lawyer” to anticipate such problems and head them off. 
Lawyers, at least the best ones, were in this account responsible for 
advising clients on both “explicit corporation law” and the “inchoate law” 
increasingly imposed on the corporations that had become public entities. 
This would ultimately make the corporate lawyer, and particularly the in-
house counsel, a “legal and economic statesman as well as corporate 
employee.”139 
Berle still criticized some aspects of the corporate law firm, but like 
much social criticism in the 1950s his focused more on the institution’s 
social effect on its workers than on its larger political impact. In discussing 
Levy’s book he asked whether the Wall Street firms did not “accomplish 
a terrible waste of many of the ablest and best trained young minds 
American legal education produces,”140 and at best hoped that the new 
opportunities offered them might “in time redeem the bulk of the 
corporation bar from the profitable but usually undistinguished bondage 
in which most of it lives.”141 The main threat he now saw from the 
corporate bar was the threat it posed to young lawyers. 
CONCLUSION 
Berle’s views of the legal profession had changed sharply over the 
past three decades. The harsh critique of the Encyclopedia is largely gone, 
replaced by an ambivalent conclusion that welcomes the lawyer-statesman 
while regretting the drudgery of many corporate lawyers’ lives.142 Looking 
back over his writings on the legal profession, we also get a clearer sense 
of why he never studied the legal profession in the way he did the 
corporation. In Berle’s accounts, the fate of the legal profession was 
always determined by that of the corporation. Causation was one-way; the 
corporate economy changed and the legal profession changed in response. 
In the 1930s he explained that the legal profession was hopelessly 
degraded because it had become subservient to corporations. In the 1950s 
his views of the legal profession changed because his views of the 
corporation had changed; the possibility had opened up for lawyers to 
become “statesman-advisors” because corporations had assumed a new 
prominence, making their leaders “corporate statesmen.” In each case 
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lawyers played a subordinate role; their profession always at the mercy of 
larger business and economic forces.143 
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